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RICHARD S. KAY*

Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgments in

American Lawt
Topic I. B
In every American jurisdiction, new rules of law announced by a
court are presumed to have retrospective effect-that is, they are presumed to apply to events occurringbefore the date of judgment. There
are, however, exceptions in certain cases where a court believes that
such applicationof the new rule will upset serious and reasonablereliance on the prior state of the law. This report summarizes these
exceptional cases. It shows that the proper occasions for issuing exclusively or partially prospective judgments have varied over time and
that there are still substantial differences in approach according to
the particularjurisdiction and the kind of law under consideration.
The report concludes with a brief survey of some of the still unresolved
jurisprudentialand constitutionalproblems raised by recognition of
the power of courts to issue non-retroactivejudgments.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Appellate decisions generally consist of two elements-the resolution of a dispute and a statement of law explaining that resolution.'
The former can only be retroactive-a judge cannot resolve a case
before it arises. Prospectivity and retroactivity only present issues
with respect to the general explanatory statements of law. Because
the more general statements are a court's best explanation of the legal rules governing certain facts, they ought to apply to other cases
based on the same kinds of facts arising both before and after the
judgment.
To the extent that a court creates or changes a rule of law in a
given case and then applies it to other cases based on past conduct, it
* Wallace Stevens Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law.
This is a substantially abridged version of the United States report submitted for the
topic, "Judicial Rulings with Prospective Effect" at the XIXth International Congress
of Comparative Law, 2014. Scott Garosshen provided essential research and editorial
assistance.
t DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2013.0017
1.

JULIUS STONE, PRECEDENT AND LAW 188 (1985).
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regulates that conduct by a retroactive rule. This raises immediate
alarms. In American law, as in most law, retroactive rules are disfavored. The United States Supreme Court expressed the prevailing
attitude:
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and
to conform their conduct accordingly; settled expectations
should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be
assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took
2
place has timeless and universal appeal.
Several provisions of the Unites States Constitution are motivated, at
least in part, by concerns about the evils of retroactive law3 and
American courts interpreting legislation indulge a strong presump4
tion against retroactivity.
The attitude, however, is quite the opposite when it comes to the
judgments of courts. The strong presumption is that statements of
law in judgments that announce new rules or overturn old ones apply
to conduct predating that judgment. This seeming inconsistency derives from the "declaratory" theory of adjudication-legislatures
make new law but courts only find and declare pre-existing law.5
Blackstone, whose influence on American law was great, understood
judgments as merely "the principal and most authoritative evidence"
of a law with a prior and independent existence. 6 Courts engage in
interpretive not creative acts.7 Joseph Story, a preeminent early
American legal authority, embraced this idea with enthusiasm. Legal
rules, he claimed, were "antecedent" to judicial decisions and the latter were valuable only for "their supposed conformity to those rules."8
From this understanding it follows that rules announced by the legis2. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855 (Scalia, J., concurring)

(citations omitted)).
3. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (states) (no ex post
facto laws); art I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (states) (no bills of attainder);
art I, § 10, cl. 1(states)(no impairment of the obligation of contracts); amend. V (federal) (no taking of property without just compensation); amends. V (federal), XIV
(states) (no deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law).
4. Landgraf,511 U.S. at 265.
5. See, e.g., Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
6. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
7. George P. Fletcher, Paradoxesin Legal Thought, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1263, 1273
(1985) (Courts do not "bring new laws into being," but provide "readings or renditions
of the meaning implicit in some independently existing, external object.").
8. Joseph Story, Value and Importance of Legal Studies, in THE MISCELLANEOUS
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 503, 508 (William W. Story ed., Da Capo Press 1972)
(1852).
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lature have only prospective effect while those announced by judges
have retroactive effect as well. 9
Modern jurisprudence, of course, has largely debunked this view
and has recognized an inevitable law-making power in courts. 10 It
might follow that the retroactivity of rules arising from adjudication
is as worrisome as that associated with legislation. That is, we should
expect cases in which people have acted in substantial and reasonable reliance on the law that preceded introduction of the "new rule"
by a court. In such cases, it might make sense to apply new judicial
rules, like new legislative rules, only to the future. So, when, in 1848,
the Ohio Supreme Court held legislative divorces unconstitutional, it
recognized that "second marriages [had] been contracted" based on
such divorces and retroactive application of its decision would "bastardize" the children born of those marriages. It was enough that the
court had declared the correct state of the law. It felt "confident that
no department of state has any disposition to violate it, and that the
evil will cease""
In the early twentieth century, as the force of the declaratory
theory began to wane, this idea of limiting judgments' effect to future
transactions was increasingly proposed as a reasonable approach
when courts created new legal rules and especially when they overruled established precedent. In 1921, Chief Judge (as he then was)
Benjamin Cardozo noted that in some cases:
when the hardship [of the retroactive effect of judge-made
law] is felt to be too great or to be unnecessary, retrospective
operation is withheld ....
It may be hard to square such a
ruling with abstract dogmas and definitions. When so much
else that a court does, is done with retroactive force, why
draw the line here? The answer is, I think, that the line is
drawn here, because the injustice and oppression of a refusal
2
to draw it would be so great as to be intolerable.'
9. Similarly, the constitutional provisions that prohibit retroactive laws generally have been held inapplicable to judicial acts. See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S.
309, 344 (1915) (ex post facto laws); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924)
(impairment of contracts). But see Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 719 F. Supp. 2d 1031,
1041-45 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (retroactive application of new tort liability violates due pro-

cess clause of fourteenth amendment). The United States Supreme Court has
sometimes attempted to restrain judicial innovation resulting in unexpected imposition of criminal liability. See infra Part III.A.
10. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1759 (1991) ("It would

only be a slight exaggeration to say that there are no more Blackstonians.")
11. Bingham v. Miller, 17 Ohio 445, 448-49 (1848).

12. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 146-47 (1921). By
this time the practice had already been noted and defended in legal commentary.
Beryl Harold Levy, Realist Jurisprudenceand Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA. L.
REV 1, 10 (1960).
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The practice had become prominent enough by 1931 that an article in
the American Bar Association Journal proposed that legislatures explicitly authorize courts to declare that new judge-made rules would
13
operate only prospectively.
In 1932, the constitutionality of such "prospective overruling"
was challenged in the United States Supreme Court.' 4 The Montana
Supreme Court had previously held that when the Montana Railroad
Commission reversed its prior determination of freight charges' reasonableness, shippers could recover the excess amounts paid under
the earlier dispensation. The Montana court overruled that interpretation but applied the old rule to the parties before it, allowing the
shipper to recover the unreasonable charges.' 5 The railroad argued
that this deprived it of property without due process of law because it
had been forced to refund the payments based on an interpretation of
the statute now acknowledged to be wrong.' 6 In Great Northern Railway. Co. v.Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., the Supreme Court rejected
this argument in a unanimous decision written by now Justice Cardozo. A state court was entitled to "make a choice for itself between
the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It
may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled,
are law none the less for intermediate transactions."' 7 The "declaratory" understanding of adjudication was merely one of several
permissible approaches:
The choice for any state may be determined by the juristic
philosophy of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of
law, its origin and nature .... [W]e may say of the earlier
decision that it has not been overruled at all. It has been
translated into a judgment of affirmance and recognized as
law anew. Accompanying the recognition is a prophecy,
which may or may not be realized in conduct, that transactions arising in the future will be governed by a different
rule .... [W]e are not at liberty, for anything contained in
the constitution of the United States, to thrust upon those
courts a different conception either of the binding force of
precedent or of the meaning of the judicial process.'
This decision put to rest any constitutional concerns with state
courts' prospective judgments.
13. Albert Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and Stare Decisis and a Proposal, 17
A.B.A.J. 180 (1931).
14. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932).

15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

360-61.
359.
364 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
365-66 (citations omitted).
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The balance of this report will examine how courts have responded to this possibility and will attempt to summarize the state of
the law. This attempt is complicated by the federal character of the
jurisdiction. The relevant law is often different from state to state.
My summary account of state law, therefore, must be more indicative
than definitive. In addition, I will describe the same issues in federal
law-the law of the United States. Although it will be apparent that
the division is in some ways artificial, I will also divide the treatment
between judgments of civil law and criminal law.

II.
A.

PROSPECTIVE JUDGMENTS IN

CIVIL

LAW

State Courts

Statements of law contained in a judgment are presumed to apply to events predating that judgment. The negative impact of this
retroactive application of judicially created rules must be substantial
before a court will consider limiting the rules to future cases. When
deciding whether to depart from the default of full retroactivity, the
foremost consideration is the nature and degree of likely reliance on
the prior state of the law. This consideration "can hardly be overemphasized." 19 Courts view some fields of law-such as contract and
property-as especially likely to induce such reliance. Apart from the
injustice of erasing or devaluing rights deemed to have already
"vested" in their holders, 20 these are fields where individuals may
have actually paid attention to existing rules of law, perhaps even
21
consulted legal advisers, before engaging in a given transaction.
By contrast, new rules of tort law seldom upset significant reliance interests. "Ordinarily," for example, "persons who drive
22
carelessly do not do so in conscious reliance upon some rule of law."
The scope of tort liability, however, may affect some decisions on
whether and how much insurance a party obtains, as well as the decision to investigate an incident for which it might be held liable.
Therefore, courts often made their decisions eliminating tort immu19. Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P. 2d 1376, 1384 (N.M.
1994)

20. See Roger J. Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling:A Question of Judicial Responsibility 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 544 (1977).
21. See id.; accord. Thomas S. Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law:
Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201, 242 (1965); MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE
NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 122 (1998).
22. Thomas E. Fairchild, Limitation of New Judge-Made Law to ProspectiveEffect
Only: "ProspectiveOverruling"or "Sunbursting,"51 MARQ. L. REV. 254, 261 (1967-68).
The same may be true of "strict liability" torts and certain intentional torts to the
person such as battery, assault or infliction of mental distress. On the other hand,
intentional torts to property, such as trespass or conversion, may sometimes be the
result of deliberate decision. Likewise, some instances of defamation or misrepresentation might be undertaken only after consideration of the relevant law.
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23
nity for municipalities and charitable institutions prospective-only.
Notably, in calculating the reliance that justifies making judicial decisions non-retroactive, courts almost always consider categories of
cases; not the presence or absence of reliance by the particular par24
ties before the court.
Whenever prospective operation is suggested there are necessarily competing considerations. Retroactive application might
undermine reasonable actions taken in reliance on the former law.
But the new judgment, by definition, supposes the altered rule to be
superior to the old one. Prospective-only operation, therefore, entails
a decision to apply an inferior rule to prior transactions. In accommodating the relevant factors, many state courts have settled on some
variation of a test formulated by the United States Supreme Court in
its 1971 decision in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.25 The test considers
three factors:

1)

2)
3)

whether the decision to be applied non-retroactively establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling
clear past precedent or by deciding an issue of first
impression;
if, in light the new rule's purpose and effect, retrospective operation would further or retard its operation; and
the extent of the inequity imposed by retroactive application, namely the injustice or hardship that would be
26
caused by retroactive application.

A court examines these factors, it must be stressed, against the background presumption that retroactivity is "overwhelmingly the
norm." 27 Thus a litigant seeking prospective-only application must
firmly convince a court that each factor favors such a decision.
23. See, e.g., Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1, 14-15 (Mich. 1960);
Thomas J. Dufour, Note, The ProperApplication of JudicialDecisions OverrulingEstablished Tort Doctrines, 65 B.U. L. REV. 315, 331 (1985).
24. Walter V. Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective
Overruling, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 642-43 (1967). But see Garfias-Rodriguez v.

Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 519-20 (9th Cir. 2012) (actual reliance on the old law by the
party before the agency is relevant to the possible prospective application of a rule
created in administrative adjudication). Some doubt has been expressed about how
often primary conduct is influenced by consideration of the current law. Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J.
907, 946 (1962) ("Thus in many cases, the parties, because of their not uncommon
ignorance of the legal principle that controls their actions, will not be able to make a
bona fide claim of surprise.").
25. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). See, e.g., Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc.,
881 P.2d 1376, 1381-85 (N.M. 1994); DiCenzo v. A-Best Prods. Co., 897 N.E.2d 132,
135-41 (Ohio 2008); Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 351-52 (W. Va.
2009). The Chevron Oil case is discussed further at infra text accompanying notes 5462.
26. Paraphrased from Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07.
27. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991) (opinion of
Souter J.).
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Once we have established that a court may limit the retroactive
application of its judgment, other questions arise. Such a decision
might mean that the new rule is to apply only to primary conduct
occurring after the date the decision is announced and to no conduct
occurring before that date. While that is sometimes the case, there
are other possibilities. A court might make a new norm partly retroactive, applying it to some but not all past events. For example, when
the Connecticut Supreme Court expanded an enterprise's "slip and
fall" tort liability to include injuries caused by a foreseeably unsafe
"mode of operation," it applied its holding to "all future cases and, as
a general rule, to all previously filed cases in which the trial has not
yet commenced .... ,"2s The court apparently concluded that the costs
of adjusting to the new rule would not be excessive if litigation had
not yet reached the trial stage.
The simple approach of starting the rule running, at the moment
of decision, has, for reasons which will become apparent, been labeled
"pure prospectivity." Neither the litigant in the case announcing the
new rule, nor any other person whose claim is based on prior events,
will be subject to that rule. 29 Since the new rule plays no role in determining the outcome of the litigation, it is technically dicta and, as
such, communicates only a prediction of what the law will be. 30 A
court might even postpone the moment that the rule becomes applicable to some date further in the future. This variation has been called
"prospective-prospective overruling." A court may reason that parties
affected by the new rule need additional time to adjust their behavior. So, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of
governmental immunity from tort liability on June 5, 1962, it held
the "effective date of the abolition of the rule" would be July 15, 1962
in order "Lt~o enable the various public bodies to make financial arrangements to meet the new liability." 3 1 When later, the same year,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, it expressed its "intention to overrule the doctrine ... with respect to tort
claims . . . arising after the next Minnesota Legislature adjourns,
subject to any statutes which now or hereafter limit or regulate the
28. Kelly v. Stop & Shop, Inc., 918 A.2d. 249, 265 n.9 (Conn. 2007). Humphrey v.
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. 993 A.2d 449 (Conn. 2010) modified this formula. See infra

note 44.
29. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 536. For a recent example see Barnett v. First
National Insurance Co. of America, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 99, 104 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(declining to apply new rule to parties before the court).
30. Walter V. Schaefer, ProspectiveRulings: Two Perspectives, 1982 Sup. CT. REV.
1, 22 (1982).

31. Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 115 N.W.2d 618, 626 (Wis. 1962). The court presumably was thinking of the time it would take to secure adequate insurance. The
next year, when the same court abolished the immunity of religious institutions, it
postponed the effect of its holding for three months. Widell v. Holy Trinity Catholic
Church, 121 N.W.2d 249, 254 (Wis. 1963). In both cases, however, the plaintiff in the
case at bar was allowed to recover.
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prosecution of such claims." This both allowed institutions to buy liability insurance and gave the legislature a chance to craft a different
liability regime that would accommodate the special interests of the
32
public entities.
"Purely" prospective judgments are relatively infrequent. Much
more commonly a court applies the new rule to the litigants in the
instant case but "then returns to the old one with respect to all
other[ [cases] arising on facts predating the pronouncement." This
course is sometimes called "selective prospectivity." 33 It is, in part,
motivated by a desire to connect a judgment's statements of law to
the particular controversy before the court. 34 More prominent is the
worry that not granting the benefit of the new rule to the party arguing for it in the case in which it is announced would discourage other
litigants from advancing claims that would change existing law. It
would, therefore, deprive the legal system of the law-reform benefits
deriving from judicial consideration of those claims.3 5 Critics have
questioned this premise. The fact that courts maintain retroactive
application in the great majority of cases is enough to motivate most
litigants. Some parties, moreover, will have a continuing interest in
the legal rule so that even if they fail to benefit in the first case, they
36
will profit from its adoption in future ones.
In addition to doubts about its incentive effect, critics of selective
prospectivity emphasize the inevitable resulting inequity. 37 The best
known example is the 1959 decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois
in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District 302.38 The plaintiff
was one of fourteen schoolchildren suffering burns and other injuries
when, due to the negligence of its driver, a school bus struck a culvert
and exploded. 39 The Supreme Court used the case to reconsider and
abolish the tort immunity of school districts. 40 Since, however, retrospective application of the decision would work a hardship on school
districts that may have failed to secure adequate insurance or to investigate prior accidents on the assumption they could not be held
32. Spanel v. Mounds View Sch. Dist. No. 621, 118 N.W.2d 795, 803-04 (Minn.
1962). See also Smith v. State, 473 P.2d 937, 950 (Idaho 1970) (tort liability of state

would "govern all future causes of action arising on or after 60 days subsequent to the
adjournment of the First Regular Session of the Forty-First Idaho State legislature
unless legislation is enacted at that session with respect to the abolition of the sovereign immunity of the state.").
33. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 536-37.
34. See EISENBERG, supra note 21 at 131.
35. See Gil J. Ghatan, The Incentive Problem with Prospective Overruling:A Critique of the Practice, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 179, 180-81. See also Fletcher,
supra note 7,at 1276.
36. See Candler S. Rogers, Perspectives on ProspectiveOverruling, 36 U. Mo. KAN.
CITY L. REV. 35, 49 (1968).
37. EISENBERG, supra note 21, at 129.
38. 163 N.E.2d 89 (Ill. 1959).
39. Id. at 89.
40. Id. at 90-98.
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responsible for them, it decided that the new liability would apply
only in "cases arising out of future occurrences." It made an exception, however, for "the plaintiff in the instant case." 41 The
unattractive consequences of this solution became apparent when
seven other children hurt in the same accident-including three of
the first plaintiffs siblings-sought relief. 42 The trial court, relying
on the Supreme Court's explicit exception for only "the plaintiff in the
instant case," dismissed the other complaints. The Supreme Court reversed since it "now appears the [first] appeal was treated by [all] the
parties as a test case ....
The facts of this litigation highlight the
arbitrary quality of selective prospectivity. The Court's second decision eliminated the inequity for those involved in the same accident
but left in place the different treatment accorded every other victim
of municipal negligence who was injured before the date of the first
44
decision.
"-43

B.

Federal Courts

Despite these concerns, most state courts maintain the option of
non-retroactivity. The situation in federal courts is more complicated.
After an initial period of infrequent and unreflective use of non-retroactivity, the United States Supreme Court systematized its approach
in 1971 by articulating the three-factor Chevron Oil test cited above
for deciding whether to apply a judgment non-retroactively. Then, in
the early 1990s, the Supreme Court reversed course and held that
federal courts must always apply their judgments retroactively. The
following is a brief summary of that evolution.
A set of cases in the nineteenth century recognized-indeed, appeared to require-non-retroactive application of judge-made
changes in state law insofar as that law was applied in federal court
litigation founded on "diversity jurisdiction," providing a federal forum where the parties to a controversy resided in different states. 45
At that time, federal judges in diversity cases developed and applied
41. Id at 97-98.
42. Molitor v. Kaneland Comty. Unit Dist. 302, 182 N.E.2d 145, 146-47 (Ill. 1962).
43. Id. at 145-46.
44. See also Humphrey v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 993 A.2d 449 (Conn.
2010), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court modified its statement in Kelly v.
Stop & Shop, Inc., 918 A2d. 249, 265 n.9 (Conn. 2007)-discussed at supra note 28that an expanded rule of tort liability would apply only to future cases and "previously
filed cases in which trial ha [d]not commenced" on the date of decision. In Humphrey,
the Court agreed that the new rule should also apply to cases where trial had begun
and the plaintiffhad raised at trial the same claim as that later adopted in Kelly. The
Court was unwilling to sustain differences occasioned by the happenstance that one
case had reached it before the other. Humphrey, 993 A.2d at 453.
45. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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their own federal common law' 46 but deferred to state courts' interpretations of enacted state law, i.e. statutes and constitutions. In an
1847 diversity case, appealed from the federal court in Mississippi,
however, the Supreme Court decided to defer only prospectively to
the state court's interpretations of enacted state law. 47 The Supreme
Court had previously held, in the absence of any state court interpretation on point, that a provision of the Mississippi constitution
prohibiting the sale of slaves was ineffective without state implementing legislation. After the contract at issue had been made,
however, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held the provision selfexecuting. 48 The United States Supreme Court agreed that federal
courts should conform to state court interpretations "from the time
they are made. But we ought not to give them a retroactive effect, and
allow them to render invalid contracts entered into with citizens of
other States, which in the judgment of this court were lawfully
made." 49 The dissenting opinion highlighted the anomaly of such a

holding, arguing that it "gives to the Constitution of Mississippi different meanings at different periods of its existence .

.

. ."5

The

majority's approach was followed in several other federal diversity
cases dealing with the validity of bonds issued by local governments
under an authority that had first been confirmed by decisions of the
state courts but subsequently denied under changed interpretations
of state constitutions. 5 1
The underlying concern about the unfairness of retroactive decisions evident in these cases, as well as in the state court decisions
already canvassed, also surfaced in connection with federal court
judgments applying federal law. On three occasions in the 1960s, perhaps influenced by its decisions refusing to apply new rules of
criminal procedure retroactively, 5 2 the Supreme Court gave its holdings only prospective effect.5 3 Only in the 1971 case of Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson, however, did the modern Supreme Court consider the
46. See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). This policy was reversed in Erie

Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) holding that federal courts in diversity
cases must apply the common law of the state where the court sits.
47. Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 134, 139 (1847).
48. Id. at 134-35.
49. Id. at 139.
50. Id. at 140 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
51. See, e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175 (1863); Douglass v. County
of Pike, 101 U.S. 677 (1879). See also Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910).
See generally Barton H. Thompson Jr., The History of the JudicialImpairment "Doc-

trine" and Its Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1373 (1992).
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. Two cases avoided invalidating completed elections. Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572
(1968). The third involved a rule of federal jurisdiction where the litigants had reasonably relied on an alternative interpretation. England v. La. State Bd. of Med.
Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 422-23 (1964).
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issue of prospectivity in depth.54 The plaintiff had sustained a personal injury while at work on Chevron's off-shore drilling platform.
Recovery for such claims was governed by a federal statute, the Outer
Continental Shelf Land Act, which specified no statute of limitations.
Most courts that had addressed the issue had held that the limitations period was controlled by the equitable doctrine of laches. 5 5
Then, in a 1969 decision, after Huson had filed his complaint, the
Supreme Court rejected those cases and interpreted the Act to borrow
the neighboring state's personal injury limitations period.5 6 For Huson, that was Louisiana and its one year statute of limitations barred
his claim.57 The Court held, however, that its 1969 decision "should
not be invoked to require application of the Louisiana time limitation
retroactively to [Huson]."5s It went on to elaborate the three criteria
already mentioned: (i) the rule had to be genuinely new; (ii) retroactive application was not necessary to further the operation of that
rule; and (iii) retroactivity "could produce substantial inequitable results."5 9 In this case, each factor favored prospective-only
application.6 0 Eight Justices joined the opinion. 6 1 As already noted,
the Chevron Oil test soon became the standard way of deciding pros62
pectivity questions in state courts.
Three decisions in the early 1990s, however, rejected the Chevron Oil test in federal courts. By this time, the Supreme Court, as
will be discussed below, had retreated from the idea that it could
limit the retroactive effect of decisions creating new constitutional
rules of criminal procedure.6 3 Each decision addressed whether taxpayers were entitled to a refund of state taxes paid under a statute
later held unconstitutional. In the first, the Supreme Court held that
taxpayers were not entitled to a full refund.6 4 Four justices applied
the Chevron Oil test, observing that state authorities had reasonably
supposed the taxes valid when imposed and that refunds "could deplete the state treasury [and] threaten[ ] the State's current
operation and future plans." 65 Four dissenting Justices, however, objected to the idea that courts could apply two different laws to
66
identical controversies simply because they arose at different times.
54. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).

55. Id. at 98-99.
56. Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
57. Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 99.
58. Id. at 100.
59. Id. at 106-07.
60. Id. at 107.
61. Justice Douglas concurred without reaching the question of retroactive effect.
Id. at 109.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 137-46.
64. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
65. Id. at 182 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
66. Id. at 205-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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They read Chevron Oil narrowly, claiming that it did not "alter the
principle that consummated transactions are analyzed under the best
current understanding of the law at the time of decision ..
,,6 The
Court denied the refunds because the ninth judge, Justice Scalia, believed the state tax in question had been and continued to be
constitutional.6 8 But he made clear that he agreed with the dissenters on prospectivity. "Since the Constitution does not change from
year to year; since it does not conform to our decisions, but our decisions are supposed to conform to it; the notion that our interpretation
of the Constitution in a particular decision could take prospective
69
form does not make sense."
"..

The writing was now on the wall. The next year, in the second
unconstitutional state tax case, the Court issued five separate opinions, none with the support of more than three justices. But again
there were five votes for the proposition that, when the Court decided
a constitutional issue and applied it to the parties at bar, it must
apply that holding to any other cases still open.7 0 Finally, in the third
case, the Court produced a single majority opinion expressing the
new understanding:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties
before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal
law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still
open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of
whether such events predate or postdate our announcement
of the rule .... .1
Although it expressed a view of adjudication hostile to any form of
non-retroactivity, the majority opinion forbade only "selective prospectivity," in which a court applies the new rule to the parties before
it but not to other conduct predating the court's judgment. It did not,
therefore, overrule Chevron Oil, which was an instance of "pure prospectivity" since the plaintiff had been given the benefit of the
previous limitations period.7 2 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that, in the absence of explicit overruling, it was still

67. Id. at 222.
68. Id. at 204-05 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
69. Id. at 201.
70. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 543-44 (1991) (opinion

of Souter, J.), 548-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).

71. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).

72. In 1995, seven justices joined an opinion stating that "Harper [the third tax
case] overruled Chevron Oil insofar as the case (selectively) permitted the prospec-

tive-only application of a new rule of law." Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S.
749, 752 (1995).
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bound to apply new rules purely prospectively when the three Chev73
ron Oil factors so required.
The Supreme Court's decisions retreating from prospective judgments show the influence of the factors already discussed that have
worried courts and commentators about the practice. A central complaint was its deviation from the judicial role. This concern reflected,
at some level, the Blackstonian view of adjudication. It was most explicit in the separate opinions of Justice Scalia. The judge's job, he
asserted, "is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall
be.... [A prospective holding] presupposes a view of our decisions as
74
creating the law, as opposed to declaring what the law already is."
Closely related to this was possible violation of the constitutional imperative that federal courts adjudicate only real "cases or
controversies." 7 5 It has been argued that this precludes a federal
court pronouncing on a legal issue unnecessary to resolve the dispute
at bar.7 6 This argument is doubtful as a matter of constitutional interpretation,7 7 but the Supreme Court had appeared to accept it in an
earlier criminal procedure case in which it had declined to apply a
new rule retroactively though it conceded that it had applied it to the
parties in the case first announcing it. In that first case, however,
retroactive application was an "unavoidable consequence of the necessity that constitutional adjudications not stand as mere dictum
[and oil Is] ound policies of decision-making, rooted in the command of
Article III of the Constitution that we resolve issues solely in concrete
cases or controversies .... ,,7
If the limits of constitutional federal jurisdiction obliged a federal
court to apply a new rule to the party in the case announcing it, then
the only kind of prospectivity available to it was "selective prospectivity." The Supreme Court, however, became unwilling to accept the
inequity of making the applicability of a rule turn solely on which
litigant happened to reach the Court first.7 9 In an earlier case, Justice Harlan had protested the consequences of this policy:
73. Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F. 3d 684, 690-95 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Jill E.
Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An EquilibriumApproach, 110 HARv. L. REV.
1055, 1062 (1997).
74. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 549 (Scalia, J., concurring);
Harper,509 U.S. at 106-07 (Scalia, J., concurring). See infra text accompanying notes
192-96.

75. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
76. Note, supra note 24, at 932.
77. See Currier, supra note 21, at 216-20.
78. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1967). See Kermit Roosevelt III, A
Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN.

L.

REV. 1075, 1111-12 (1999).

79. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application of
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 811, 866 (2003).

Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV.
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Simply fishing one case from the stream of appellate review,
using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases
subsequently to flow by unaffected by that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from this model of judicial
review.8 0
These arguments, which had already convinced a majority of the
Court in the field of criminal procedure, ultimately led to a policy of
"full retroactivity" in the adjudication of federal civil cases.,'
It is important to remember that the development just traced is
applicable only to changes in federal law. As already noted, state
courts applying state law retain the option of prospective-only effect
when declaring new rules. Such a practice, moreover, continues to be
constitutionally permissible under the rule of Great Northern Railway. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co. s 2 These courts have
generally rejected the reasoning of the United States Supreme
Court's post-Chevron Oil cases. Indeed, the Chevron Oil analysis remains the most common test in state jurisdictions for deciding
whether to apply a new rule retroactively. 3 When, however, state
courts apply a new judge-made rule of federal law, the Supremacy
Clause of the federal Constitution requires that they apply it retroactively in accordance with the holdings of the United States Supreme
4
Court.
C.

The Limits of Retroactivity

There are necessary limits to the presumptive retroactive application of judicial pronouncements. Although the United States
Supreme Court has said that "a rule of federal law, once announced
and applied ...must be given full retroactive effect by all courts adjudicating federal law," it restricts that command to "cases still open on
direct review." 5 No one suggests that a new rule requires courts to
re-open and re-decide every case ever litigated to which a new rule
might apply. A rule's retroactivity does not extend to cases that have
proceeded to:
80. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 679 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and

dissenting).
81. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993).

82. 287 U.S. 358 (1932).
83. Some recent examples are Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co., 810
N.W.2d 465, 479-80 (Wis. 2012); Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa, 983 N.E.2d 1317,

1328 (Ohio 2012); Bezeau v. Palace Sports & Ent., Inc., 795 N.W.2d 797, 802 (Mich.
2010); Ex parte Capstone Bldg. Corp. 96 So. 3d 77, 90-95 (Ala. 2012).

84. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 754 (1995); Harper, 509 U.S.
at 100.
85. Harper, 509 U.S. at 96, 97.
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such a degree of finality that the rights of the parties should
be considered frozen.... IT]hat moment should be when the
transaction is beyond challenge either because the statute of
limitations has run or the rights of the parties have been
8 6
fixed by litigation and have become res judicata
In Chicot County DrainageDistrict v. Baxter State Bank, 7 bondholders whose rights had been reduced under a federal statute
subsequently declared unconstitutional sought to recover the full
amount originally due. The Supreme Court noted that a 1936 District
Court proceeding-in which the validity of the governing law was not
raised-had confirmed the prior adjustment and had never been appealed.8 8 The law's constitutionality was thus res judicata and could
not be raised in a collateral proceeding. 9 As the Court put it in a
later case, "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment
may have been wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently
overruled in another case." 90
The limits of retroactivity are grounded in strong practical policy. "A contrary rule," as one state court noted, "would produce chaos
in the legal system, as judgments could be continually opened and
reopened with every fluctuation in the law."9 1 A nineteenth century
Supreme Court decision put the matter powerfully:
IT]he maintenance of public order, the repose of society, and
the quiet of families, require that what has been definitely
determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as irrefragable legal truth. So deeply is this principle implanted
in [our] jurisprudence, that commentators upon it have said,
that res judicata renders white that which is black, and
92
straight that which is crooked.
The policy of finality in civil litigation, however, is not absolute.
In rare cases, parties may collaterally attack otherwise final judgments-but only if the case is truly exceptional. Both the
86. United States v. Estate of Donnelly, 397 U.S. 286, 296 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). See also James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 541 (1991)

(opinion of Souter, J.).
87. 308 U.S. 371 (1940).
88. Id. at 372-74.
89. Id. at 378.
90. Fed. Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981).
91. Quantum Res. Mgm't, L.L.C. v. Pirate Lake Oil Corp., 112 So. 3d 209, 217 (La.
2013), cert. denied sub nom. Haydel v. Zodiac Corp., 134 S. Ct. 197 (2013). The complainants had asked to re-open a 1925 tax sale on the basis of a 1983 United States
Supreme Court decision. 112. So. 2d 217.
92. Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 352, 364 (1859). The Court was commenting
on the doctrine as adopted in Louisiana but, as one commentator noted, it would "apply with equal truth to any of the United States." 2 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS 764 (1902).
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Restatement (Second) of Judgments and the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure articulate such a possibility.
Section 73(2) of the Restatement states that a judgment "may be
set aside or modified if . . . "Itihere has been such a substantial
change in the circumstances that giving continued effect to the judgment is unjust." Noting that this principle has sometimes been
applied to cases where a later decision changed the law applied in an
earlier, unrelated judgment, however, Comment (c) to this section labels such decisions "a misinterpretation of the rule and a very
unsound policy."

93

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifies five
grounds for "relief from a final judgment" none of which speak directly to a change in the governing law. A sixth refers to "any other
reason that justifies relief." The rare cases in which the Supreme
Court has considered applying Rule 60(b)(6) in connection with a
change in the law are inconclusive. 9 4 One judge has described Rule
60(b)(6) jurisprudence as showing "a strong current of unwillingness
to reopen judgments but with some wriggle room for future arguments." 95 Still, other lower federal courts have referred to the rule as
"a grand reservoir of equitable power," 96 and have assumed that an
"intervening change of controlling law" may justify exercising

9
it.
7

In

practice, this kind of relief is very unusual. Whenever courts note the
possibility of modifying a final judgment, they always stress the need
to show particularly compelling reasons. Notwithstanding the occasional exception, it is fair to say that the presumptive-and in federal
courts nearly compulsory-retroactive effect of civil judgments
reaches back only to controversies still open to judicial resolution. At
some point adjudication comes to an end and unsuccessful civil litigants are denied the solace of newer and friendlier law.
In criminal cases, where a defendant remains in custody, however, the finality of a conviction is not so unqualified. The continuing
possibility of collateral attack has been critical in shaping the law of
the retroactivity and prospectivity of judicial decisions. This is the
subject of the next section.

93.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§73(2), cmt. c.(1982).

94. Compare Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950) with Polites v.
United States, 364 U.S. 433 (1960).
95. Norgaard v. DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1074, 1078 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Easterbrook, Cir. J.). This decision contains an extended argument for a strict interpretation of Rule 60(b)(6) when the motion to modify a judgment is based on a
subsequent change in the law.
96. Radack v. Norwegian Am. Line Agency, Inc., 318 F.2d 538, 542 (2d. Cir. 1963).
97. Marrero Pichardo v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 46, 56 (2d Cir. 2004).
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PROSPECTIVE JUDGMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW

Substantive Liability

Discomfort with retroactive law has been most acute in connection with retroactive criminal liability. The United States
Constitution explicitly prohibits all ex post facto criminal laws.98 The
values underlying these worries are not entirely clear. The reliance
interest, so prominent in civil prospectivity jurisprudence, may play a
role if an actor is likely to consult the criminal law before acting. But
criminal acts, like most tortious acts, are seldom the subject of selfconscious reliance on the law.9 9 The objection to ex post facto criminality seems premised on some more rudimentary sense of
fairness.' 0 0
The Supreme Court has held that the constitutional limitation
on "ex post facto laws" refers only to legislation; not to judicial
acts. 10 1 This presents few problems when judicial action contractsthe
scope of criminal behavior. When a criminal statute is held unconstitutional, even a final judgment of conviction is deemed void and may
be subject to collateral attack. 0 2 More serious issues arise when
courts interpret criminal law to reach acts that appeared lawful when
committed. Such cases seem to raise problems identical to those underlying the ban on ex post facto legislation. As a result, courts have
tried to find ways to apply these new interpretations only prospectively.' 0 3 In State v. Jones, for example, the Supreme Court of New
04
Mexico changed its construction of the statute forbidding lotteries.
The defendants' previous conviction for holding a "bank night" promotion at a movie theater had been reversed by the Supreme Court
that held that such events were not lotteries. 10 5 But when they were
prosecuted a second time for the same offense, the Supreme Court
rejected its former interpretation and held that bank nights were lotteries. Since, however, the defendants "did only that which this court
declared, even if erroneously, to be within the law" the "plainest principles of justice" demanded that the new interpretation should be
given only prospective effect. The court declared that its new view of
the statute would be observed only "in cases having their origin in
98. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3 (federal); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (states).
99. Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between Criminaland Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. L.J. 2143, 2160-63 (1996).
100. See Traynor, supra note 20, at 548-49.
101. See note 9 supra.
102. See Traynor, supra note 20, at 553 n.54 (citingExparte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
376-77 (1879).

103. See Rogers, supra note 36, at 64.
104. 107 P.2d 324 (N.M. 1940).
105. Id. at 325.
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acts and conduct
occurring subsequent to the effective date of this
6
decision."

0

The Supreme Court of the United States dealt with a similar
problem in James v. United States, a prosecution for tax evasion
based on the defendant's failure to report embezzled funds as income. 10 7 An earlier case, Commissioner v. Wilcox, had held that
embezzled funds were not income for these purposes. 08 Three justices thought Wilcox continued to be good law and would have
dismissed the prosecution on that basis.' 0 9 Three different justices
would have overruled Wilcox and remanded for a new trial." 0 A third
set of three justices would have overruled Wilcox but also dismissed
this case because the existence of the Wilcox holding made it impossible to attribute to the defendant the "willfulness" necessary to
sustain a conviction."' The net result of this division was that the
Court overruled Wilcox but did not apply its new interpretation to the
case before it or to any tax returns filed before the date of the
2
decision."
It should be noted, however, that six justices in the James case
rejected the idea that the Court could apply its interpretation of the
criminal law prospectively only. In his separate opinion, Justice
Black dismissed the idea of prospective overruling but also thought
that any criminal statute so ambiguous as to be susceptible of an entirely unexpected interpretation would "raise[ I serious questions of
unconstitutional vagueness."" 3 The Court applied that reasoning in
Bouie v.City of Columbia." 4 The South Carolina Supreme Court had
adopted a new and surprising interpretation of the state's criminal
trespass law to sustain the conviction of civil rights demonstrators
conducting a "sit-in" at a segregated lunch counter. 15 The United
States Supreme Court held that this "unforeseeable and retroactive
judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language" was a
"deprivation of the right of fair warning." Such an interpretation, if
"applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law
....If a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from

passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is
106. Id. at 329.
107. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
108. 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946).
109. James, 366 U.S. at 248 (Whittaker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
110. Id. at 241 (Clark, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. (Harlan, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part).
111. Id. at 221-22 (opinion of Warren, C.J.).
112. Id. at 222.
113. Id. at 224-25 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).

115. Id. at 349-50.
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barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same
16
result by judicial construction.""
B.

New ConstitutionalRules of CriminalProcedure

While American courts generally apply reductions in criminal liability retroactively and enlargements of that liability only
prospectively, the rules governing application of changes in criminal
procedure are much more complicated. In the early 1960s, the United
States Supreme Court decided a number of cases dramatically enlarging the rights of criminal defendants, including the right to
counsel, 1 7 to remain silent," 8 to fair procedures in identification by
witnesses," 9 and to exclude improperly secured evidence.' 20 The cumulative effect
has more than once been described as a
"revolution."' 2 ' Judged under these new constitutional standards,
many prior convictions would be invalid. During the same period, the
Supreme Court also expanded the opportunities to attack a constitutionally defective state court conviction in federal court through a
22
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.'
These developments were ominous for a regime of thorough retroactivity. Thousands of incarcerated people were now in a position to
reopen and possibly reverse their criminal convictions. One obvious
solution was to hold the new rules of criminal procedure were at least
partly non-retroactive. The issue came before the Supreme Court in
1965 in Linkletter v. Walker.' 2 3 Three years before, in Mapp v. Ohio,
the Court had held that the Fourth Amendment made improperly
seized evidence inadmissible in criminal prosecutions in state
116. Id. at 352-54 (citing JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 61
(2d ed. 1960)). See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (reversing obscenity conviction that was unconstitutional under the First Amendment case law
prevailing at the time of the trial even though the conviction might have been constitutional under a subsequently adopted standard in force at the time of the Supreme
Court's decision). The Court qualified its decision in Bouie in Rogers v. Tennessee, 532
U.S. 451 (2001) in which it upheld a conviction based on the state court's decision to
abandon the common law "year and a day" defense to homicide prosecution. The
Court denied that identical limits constrained legislation and judicial interpretation.
This was especially true for the application of common law rules that "presuppose [] a
measure of evolution that is incompatible with stringent application of ex post facto
principles." Id. at 461-62.
117. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
118. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
119. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
120. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
121. See Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1 (1995).
122. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (holding that failure to raise a constitutional claim in state proceedings did not preclude habeas relief in federal court).
Under the current statute, habeas corpus is available for persons "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
123. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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courts. 124Linkletter was convicted of burglary in Louisiana in 1959
based, in part, on evidence subsequently held to be illegal. The state
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction in 1960. After the decision in
Mapp, Linkletter petitioned in federal court for a writ of habeas
corpus. The United States Supreme Court held that the rule of Mapp
was not fully retroactive.'2 5 The Court cited some of the civil cases
discussed above in Part II for the proposition that "the Constitution
neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect." "[W]e must ...
weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior
history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether
retrospective operation will further or retard its operation."' 26 Since
Mapp was intended only as a "deterrent to lawless police action" its
purpose would not be "advanced by making the rule retrospective."
Past police misconduct could not be undone "by releasing the prisoners involved."' 27 Moreover, states' reliance on prior law was due the
same respect that private reliance was given when new rules
changed civil liability.' 28 Given the number of potential petitioners,
retroactive application "would tax the administration of justice to the
29
utmost."1
The Court later rephrased the proper approach in a formula:
The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicates (a)
the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old
standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice
1 30
of a retroactive application of the new standards.
Linkletter itself denied retroactive application only to cases that were
already final when the new rule was announced.13 ' In Stovall v.
Denno, however, the Court held that a new rule, excluding evidence
of a police-arranged eyewitness identification in the absence of counsel, would affect only confrontations occurring after the new rule had
been announced.' 3 2 Thus, it would apply neither to final cases nor to
some cases still open on direct review. The underlying reasons for
non-retroactivity provided no basis to distinguish between final con-

124. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
125. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 640.
126. Id. at 629.

127. Id. at 636-37.
128. See id. For a criticism of this equation, see Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The
High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV.L. REV.
56, 73-74 (1965).

129.
130.
131.
132.

Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637.
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
381 U.S. at 622.
388 U.S. at 296.
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victions and those still "at various stages of trial and direct
33
review."1
In subsequent cases, the Court set various effective dates for the
applicability of new rules of criminal procedure. A rule excluding a
defendant's statements made without adequate warnings about the
right to counsel applied only to cases in which the trial began after
the new rule was announced. 13 4 The holding that electronic surveillance was a "search" or "seizure" subject to the Fourth Amendment
applied only to cases in which the surveillance was undertaken after
the relevant judgment.' 35 New rules on permissible searches incident
to arrest applied only to searches occurring after the promulgation of
36
those rules.'
This era of prospectivity, however, was short-lived. Starting in
the late 1960s, Justice Harlan, who had joined some of the early opinions, issued a series of powerful dissents to the Court's decisions. He
objected to a perceived departure from the Court's judicial role and
was especially offended by the Court's record of what we have called
"selective prospectivity." Typically, the Court decided the constitutional question in one case, applying its new rule-necessarily
retroactively-to the parties at bar. It only addressed the retroactivity question when another party raised it in a later case. Deciding the
new rule was only prospective at that point resulted in an intolerable
inequity. 37 Justice Harlan, therefore, advocated the full retroactivity
of constitutional judgments for all cases not yet final in the sense that
38
the defendants had exhausted all available appeals.
A majority of the Court adopted his arguments after Justice
Harlan had left the bench. The 1982 case of United States v. Johnson' 39 concerned the retroactivity of a 1980 decision 140 holding that
the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless entry into a residence
133. Id. at 300.
134. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966) (concerning retroactivity of
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1966), and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).

135. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 (1969) (concerning retroactivity of
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
136. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 656 (1971) (plurality opinion) (concerning retroactivity of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). For a summary of
the different effective times see Julie R. O'Sullivan, Note, United States. v. Johnson:
Reformulating the Retroactivity Doctrine, 69 CORNELL L.J. 166, 174-75 (1983).
137. See the quotation from Justice Harlan's opinion in Mackey v. United States,
reproduced at supra text accompanying note 80.
138.

Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and

dissenting).
139. 457 U.S. 537 (1982). By this time a substantial critical academic commentary
had also developed. See James R. McCall, A Basic Concern for Process: Commentary
on Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 809 (1999) ("[D]uring
the 1970s . . . scholars were having 'a veritable field day' with the Warren Court's
opinions on prospective overruling.").

140. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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to make a routine arrest. The Court held that its decisions should
usually be "applied retroactively to all convictions that were not yet
final at the time the decision was rendered." 14 1 In a significant limitation, however, the Court permitted non-retroactive application of
new rules that were "clear break[s] with the past."1 4 2 In these cases,
"prospectivity [was] arguably the proper course."' 43 In 1987, however, in Griffith v. Kentucky,' 44 the Court abandoned this "clear
break" exception when it held that a new rule" 45 limiting a prosecutor's ability to use peremptory challenges based on a potential juror's
race would apply retroactively notwithstanding its admitted novelty.
Current federal law on the retroactivity of new decisions on questions
of criminal procedure has thus reverted to the holding of Linkletter v.
Walker: "A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct
review or not yet final ....
The key moment for cutting off the retroactive effect of judgments announcing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure,
therefore, is when a state court conviction has become "final"-i.e.,
when there is no further opportunity for direct appellate review either in the state courts or by writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. As in civil litigation, this point has been defended by
the need to bring proceedings to some identifiable close. There must,
Justice Harlan had argued, "be a visible end to the litigable aspect of
the criminal process .... If law, criminal or otherwise, is worth hav-

ing and enforcing, it must at some time provide a definitive answer to
the
question litigants present or else it never provides an answer at
a1147
all." 7
Historically, however, res judicata did not shield a final criminal
judgment from challenge as fully as it would a final civil judgment.
"Because of habeas corpus and similar writs,

. . .

[a] criminal judg-

ment of conviction does not enjoy the same degree of finality until the
defendant has been executed, died in prison, or been released."' 4 A
habeas petition technically initiates a new civil action "for the en141. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 562. Ironically, this decision was held not to "affect those
cases that would be clearly controlled by our existing retroactivity precedents," making the restoration of the retroactivity rule non-retroactive in a substantial number of
cases. Id.
142. Id. at 558.
143. Id. at 559 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 659 (1971)).
144. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
145. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
146. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328.
147. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690-91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring
and dissenting).
148. Currier, supra note 21, at 258-59. See also 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

864 (3d ed. 2000).
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forcement of the right to personal liberty .... *"149 Expressly limiting
"full" retroactive application to cases still "on direct review" was,
therefore, essential to avoid potentially re-opening the conviction of
every defendant still in custody. Since many of the new criminal procedure rules were concededly unrelated to the merits of a
prosecution, applying them retroactively to finally adjudicated convictions would result in the "wholesale release of the guilty." 15 0 If it
did nothing else, this limitation imposed a quantitative limit on the
resulting disruption.' 5 '
Nonetheless, refusing to apply a new rule of criminal procedure
to all defendants incarcerated as a result of trials in which that rule
had not been observed necessarily involved some arbitrariness. It
kept "all people in jail who were unfortunate enough to have had
their unconstitutional convictions affirmed before June 19, 1961."152
As the dissent was quick to point out, Linkletter had committed his
offense before the defendant in Mapp, who had been released under
that case's new exclusionary rule. If the courts had not delayed in
resolving Linkletter's appeal, his case would have reached the Supreme Court first and he would have been released under the new
exclusionary rule instead.' 5 3 "Too many irrelevant considerations,"
noted one commentator, "including the common cold, bear upon the
15 4
rate of progress of a case through the judicial system."
Limiting the retroactive effect of new criminal procedure rules to
cases on direct review has been defended not so much as a logical
feature of retroactivity but as an aspect of the restricted purpose of
habeas corpus in federal courts. On this account, habeas exists not to
correct errors but to ensure that state courts adhere to applicable federal standards of criminal justice. For this purpose, it generally
suffices that criminal prosecutions conform to the law in effect at the
time of the trial. 5 5 The Supreme Court crystallized this approach in
1988 in Teague v. Lane.'5 6 "The relevant frame of reference," it em149.

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423 (1963). In "extraordinary" cases, moreover,

even when habeas corpus is not available, a final criminal conviction may be reviewed
by application in federal court for a writ ofcoram nobis. United States v. Denedo, 556
U.S. 904, 916 (2009).

150. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637-38. See also Roosevelt, supra note 78, at 1091.
151. See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 10, at 1815. In this respect, however, consider Justice White's dissent in Shea v. Louisiana, 470 U.S. 51, 64 n.1 (1985) ("[B]y
the same token, it would be less burdensome to apply Edwards retroactively to all
cases involving defendants whose last names begin with the letter'S' than to make
the decision fully retroactive.").
152. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 641 (Black, J., dissenting).
153. Id.
154. Schaefer, supra note 24, at 645. See also Shea, 470 U.S. at 63 (White, J., dissenting); Currier, supra note 21, at 202, 259-260; Michael B. Dashjian, The
ProspectiveApplication of Judicial Legislation, 24 PAC. L.J. 317, 381 n.352 (1993).
155. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 684, 687, 691-92 (1971) (Harlan,

J., concurring and dissenting); Roosevelt, supra note 78, at 1093-94.
156. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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phasized, "is not the purpose of the new rule whose benefit the
[defendant] seeks, but instead the purposes for which the writ of
habeas corpus is made available."1 5 7 A rule declared only after a conviction was final could not be relied on in a subsequent collateral
proceeding. There were two narrow exceptions. A dissenting Justice
summarized them accurately:
Any time a federal habeas petitioner's claim, if successful,
would result in the announcement of a new rule of law,... it
may only be adjudicated if that rule would [1] plac[e] certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, or
[2] if it would mandate new procedures without which the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously
diminished.' 58
Although some parts of this analysis commanded the assent of only
four justices, a majority of the Court approved it the following
year. 15 9 Teague's rules are now treated "as the settled guidelines for
60
determining what law applies on habeas review."'
Teague's restriction on the use of "new rules" on collateral review
has been interpreted very broadly. A new rule need not be the kind of
"clean break" briefly significant under United States v. Johnson.'6 '
"LA] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by prece1 62
dent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final."
Even though a judgment is carefully and plausibly explained as an
application of existing law, it may still be a "new rule." It qualifies,
according to a later decision, so long its outcome "was susceptible to
debate among reasonable minds."' 6 3 "[Ainy reading beyond the narrowest reasonable reading of [applicable] precedent ... can readily be
viewed as a 'new rule.' "164
This broad understanding of eligible new rules is reinforced by
the Court's parsimonious reading of Teague's two exceptions. The
first concerned new rules that placed "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe."' 65 This falls within the well-established doc157. Id. at 306 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. at 682 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
159. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

160.

LA FAVE,

supra note 148, at 880.

161. See supra text accompanying notes 139-43.
162. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
163. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990). For a recent application, see
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).

164.

LA FAVE,

supra note 148, at 882.

165. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
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trine that decisions narrowing the scope of criminal liability should
be fully retroactive. 166 Therefore, a court recently held that it was
proper to reconsider a final unappealed conviction for gun possession
after the Supreme Court found the relevant statute unconstitutional. 167 This exception also allows collateral review when a court
reinterprets a criminal statute to exclude a petitioner's conduct.' 68
The second exception permits a habeas court to review an otherwise final conviction if it were obtained in violation of a laterformulated "watershed rule[ I] of criminal procedure," non-observance
of which would result in "the likelihood of an accurate conviction [being] seriously diminished."' 6 9 This exception has turned out to be
extremely limited in practice. Such a rule must "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness
of a proceeding." 7 0° The Court had already recognized that the great
bulk of the new procedures mandated in the rights revolution of the
1960s did not measurably enhance the truth-finding aspects of a
criminal prosecution. They were aimed only at deterring unconstitutional police or prosecutorial misconduct. 71 ' The Supreme Court has,
in fact, identified only one case whose rule would satisfy this criterion-Gideon v.Wainwright, 7 2 which mandated legal representation
at public expense for indigent defendants. 7 3 The Court has declined,
on the other hand, to allow a death-row prisoner to challenge his execution collaterally based on a Supreme Court judgment-announced
after his sentence holding that an aggravating factor essential to impose the death penalty must be determined by the jury and not the
74
judge.'
In 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act. (AEDPA)] "7 It restricted the right of state court defendants to challenge their convictions by collateral review in federal
court, creating, among other requirements, strict time limits. It also
specified that, if a particular claim had been "adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings," a federal court could not issue a writ of
habeas corpus unless the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
166. See supra text accompanying note 102. But see Warring v. Colpoys, 122 F.2d
642, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
167. Magnus v. United States, 11 A.3d 237, 243-46 (D.C. 2011). The rehearing was
held to be a proper exercise of a court's power to issue a writ of error, coram nobis.
168. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998).
169. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 313.
170. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 418 (2007).
171. See e.g. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965).
172. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
173. Whorton, 549 U.S. at 419.
174. Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352-56 (2004).

175. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
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This requirement roughly mirrors the plu-

rality approach in Teague in that the "clearly established federal law"
to which the state court decision must conform is the law at the time
of that state court decision;
not subsequently declared changes in the
17 7
required procedures.
The Act and the Court's doctrine are not, however, precisely congruent. For example, the "new rule" that may not be relied on for
habeas relief under Teague is one announced after the petitioner's
case became final.' 7 8 But the "clearly established Federal law" to
which a state court decision might conform to bar such relief under
the statute is that existing at the time of the relevant decision, even if
the law was changed before the conviction became final-so that it
might have been properly applied in reviewing the decision under
Griffith and Teague.'7 9 Both sets of limitations-of Teague and of the
Act-must be overcome before a federal district court may grant a
habeas petition.'8 0
The foregoing discussion concerns only the limits of retroactive
application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure in collateral review of state criminal convictions in federal courts. State law
also typically allows collateral attacks on convictions even after direct
review is no longer available. State courts are free to apply new rules
of criminal procedure on such review, even if a federal court could
not.'"' State courts, in fact, apply a range of approaches when deciding whether to apply such law. Many have adopted the federal
approach articulated in Teague.' s2 Others have kept the three factor
test adopted-and now rejected-by the United States Supreme
s3
Court in Linkletter v. Walker and Stovall v. Denno.'
IV.

THE PROBLEMS OF PROSPECTIVE ADJUDICATION

As this summary indicates, the history and current status of the
once widely accepted idea that judicial pronouncements of law are

thoroughly retroactive are complicated and obscure. At present, for
civil cases, most state courts applying state law examine the relevant
factors favoring or disfavoring prospective application on a case-bycase basis. All courts must apply new rules of federal law to all cases
176. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
177. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).
178. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989).
179. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44-45 (2011).
180. Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 271(2002) (per curiam), See also LARRY W.
YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 183-200 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the rela-

tionship between the statute and the case law).
181. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 295 (2008).
182. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 939 N.E.2d 352 (Ill. 2010); Commonwealth v.
Cunningham, No. 38 EAP 2012, 2013 WL 5814388 (Pa. Oct. 30, 2013).
183. See, e.g., State v. Knight, 678 A.2d 642, 652 (N.J. 1996). On Linkletter and
Stovall, see supra text accompanying notes 123-30.
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still pending on direct review at the time that the rule is declared.
Almost all courts find a way to apply a judicially-narrowed rule of
criminal liability retroactively but refuse to do the same when the
scope of liability has been broadened. The United States Supreme
Court, after a period when it made some new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure selectively prospective, has now settled on a "firm
rule of retroactivity," 1 4 binding all courts. This retroactivity, however, reaches back only to cases in which direct appeals remain
available. Collateral attack of a conviction based on a subsequently
announced procedural rule is permitted in federal courts only within
the narrow exceptions defined in Teague v. Lane and the AEDPA' 1s5
State courts collaterally reviewing a judgment are not bound by
Teague or the AEDPA and apply a variety of approaches. These divergent standards show that the retroactivity and prospectivity of
judicially-created law remains profoundly controversial in American
jurisprudence.
The disagreement has often been expressed in terms of the practice's relation to the doctrine of stare decisis. The declaration of a
genuinely new rule is, by definition, a break with the discipline of
stare decisis. Still, its advocates have argued that prospective overruling is supported by that doctrine's principal purposes. "By not
applying a law-changing decision retroactively, a court respects the
settled expectations that have built up around the old law."'8 6 This
argument, however, turns out to be two-edged sword. The very capacity of a prospective ruling to accommodate justified reliance may
remove one of the greatest incentives to adhere to precedent:
By announcing new rules prospectively or by applying them
selectively, a court may dodge the stare decisis bullet by
avoiding the disruption of settled expectations that otherwise prevents us from disturbing our settled precedents.
Because it forces us to consider the disruption that our new
decisional rules cause, retroactivity combines with stare decisis to prevent us from altering the law each time the
87
opportunity presents itself.'

184. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278 n.32 (1994).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 156-80.
186. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 551-52 (1991)

(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
187. James B. Beam, 501 U.S. at 548 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). See also id. at 549
(Scalia, J., concurring). Prospective-only judgments are also obviously in tension with
the stare decisis policy of equitable treatment of litigants insofar as it distinguishes
parties solely on the basis of when their dispute arose. See Carl A. Auerbach, A Revival of Some Ancient Learning: A Critique of Eisenberg's The Nature of the Common
Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 539, 571 (1991).
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"Prospective decisionmaking," according to Justice Scalia, "is the
handmaid of judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare
decisis."ss
Prospective overruling, therefore, may encourage and legitimate
judicial legislation.'8 9 This has been a criticism of non-retroactive
judgments as long as they have been rendered in American courts.' 90
It was also a prominent theme in the Supreme Court's debate on the
practice in the second half of the twentieth century. Justice Harlan
accused those willing to apply a new rule of criminal procedure only
prospectively of feeling "free to act, in effect, like a legislature, making its new constitutional rules wholly or partially retroactive or only
prospective as it deems wise."' 9 '
This disapproval, of course, assumes that it is improper for
courts to make law. It depends, that is, on some form of the declaratory theory of adjudication. Indeed, in a concurring opinion endorsing
full retroactivity, Justice Scalia quoted extensively from Blackstone.' 9 2 But this was a theory which the advocates of limited
93
retroactivity had already rejected, in fact, ridiculed for decades.
Advocacy of non-retroactive judgments has, in fact, often been associated with the American legal realist critique of formalist
jurisprudence. One commentator was pleased at the prospect that
"the more courts begin to utilize prospective overruling the more it
will become obvious that the judge is, in fact, inescapably a judicial
legislator."1 9 4 And, in an unusually candid judicial recognition of the
realist position, Justice O'Connor defended non-retroactive judgments by citing Marbury v. Madison: "[Pirecisely because this Court
has 'the power to say what the law is,' when the Court changes its
mind, the law changes with it."' 9 5 By the late twentieth century, this
188. Harper v. Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
189. See Rogers, supra note 36, at 36-37 ("[A]n exploration of this doctrine of prospective overruling is but a specialized examination of the limits of judicial
lawmaking with particular regard to the element of time of application of the overruling decision.").
190. See, e.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. 175, 211 (1863) (Miller, J., dis-

senting) ("[The majority] ...holds that the decision of the court makes the law, and in
fact, that the same statute or constitution means one thing in 1853, and another thing
in 1859.").
191. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring and

dissenting).

192. Harper, 509 U.S. at 106-07 (Scalia, J., concurring). In criticizing Linkletter,

Paul Mishkin stressed the "symbolic ideal reflected in the Blackstonian concept and
...the emotional loyalties it commands.") Mishkin, supra note 128, at 66 (emphasis
added).
193. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 20, at 535 (deriding as "moonspinning" the idea

that "judges do no more than discover the law that marvelously has always existed,
awaiting only the judicial pen that would find the right words for all to heed.").
194. See Levy, supra note 12, at 16.
195. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 550 (1991) (O'Connor,

J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
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was a position with which it was difficult to argue and it undermined
the claim that non-retroactivity was somehow inconsistent with the
1 96
nature of adjudication.
To the extent that the practice of giving judgments only prospective effect reflects modern recognition of the law-making power of
judges, we might expect it to be employed differently depending on
the underlying source of the law being applied. The demise of the
declaratory theory led first to the conclusion that the judicial creation
and modification of common law rules were inevitably exercises of
judicial legislation. The idea that enacted law does not pre-exist judicial cases invoking it, however, is markedly harder to sustain. It
might follow that courts could limit the applicability in time of their
common law judgments but not those bottomed on statutes or

constitutions. 197
A few cases support this intuition. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court has held that "[wihere a decision does not announce
new common-law rules or rights but rather construes a statute, no
analysis of retroactive or prospective effect is required because at issue is the meaning of the statute since its enactment." 98 For the
most part, however, neither courts nor commentators have regarded
the source of the law at issue as of much consequence to the temporal
effect of a judgment. Cardozo thought there was no "adequate distinction" between changes of rulings concerning statutes or common
law."' 99 Likewise, when he wrote the Supreme Court's Sunburst
opinion, upholding the constitutionality of prospective overruling by
state courts, he noted that the "alternative is the same whether the
20 0
subject of the new decision is common law or statute."
In fact, some observers have noted that prospective rulings have
been more common in the case of new statutory interpretations than
(1803). Justice Scalia later claimed that this interpretation of Marbury "would have
struck John Marshall as an extraordinary assertion of raw power." Harper, 509 U.S.
at 106-07 (Scalia, J. concurring).
196. See, e.g. Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 677-81 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting).

197. See Roosevelt, supra note 78, at 1076, 1107.
198. In re McIntire, 936 N.E.2d 424, 428 (Mass. 2010). Nevertheless, the Court
limited the retroactivity of new interpretations of enacted law in two subsequent
cases. See Shirley Wayside Ltd. P'ship v. Bd. of Appeals, 961 N.E.2d 1055, 1065
(Mass. 2012); Eaton v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1132-33 (Mass.
2012). See also Kendrick v. Dist. Attorney of Phila. City, 916 A.2d 529, 539 (Pa. 2007)
("[C]ourts should have the least flexibility where ... the holding at issue.., involves
an interpretation of a statute."); State v. Cabagbag, 277 P. 3d 1027, 1041-42 (Haw.
2012)(the state Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory power over lower courts
may be made prospective).
199. CARDOZO, supra note 12, at 148-49 (citation omitted).
200. Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 365 (citations
omitted). On Sunburst see supra text accompanying notes 14-18.

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 62

in the case of new common law rules. 20 1 The justification for such a
priority has never been thoroughly explained. In Sunburst, Justice
Cardozo assumed that the decision to apply judgments retroactively
or prospectively-in whatever kind of case-was an aspect of the doctrine of stare decisis, that doctrine itself was a part of the common
law, and, therefore, it was within the authority of the judges. 20 2 One
writer has suggested that individuals are more likely to rely on statutory or constitutional rights than common law rights and are
therefore entitled to a greater degree of protection. 20 3 A recent decision of the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal addressed the
"seemingly compelling" argument that a state court was without
power to treat a statutory interpretation as anything but fully retroactive. The court noted that legislatures often write broad statutes,
relying on courts to refine and apply them. "[Tihe judicial development of the legislatively-created concept is little different from the
development of judicially-announced law" so a court could properly
20 4
consider whether its interpretation should applied retroactively.
In sum, the current confused state of the law on the possibility of
limited retroactivity of judgments demonstrates a persistent and possibly irresoluble tension in the American view of law and of the roles
of legal institutions. The separation of powers, a fundamental dogma
of the constitutional system, assumes that we are able to identify
with some confidence what distinguishes "legislative" from "judicial"
functions. 20 5 The declaratory view of adjudication fit comfortably
with that assumption. But that view, that the content of the law exists prior to and independent of its application by the courts, now
seems irretrievably lost. Even with respect to written law, modern
notions of interpretation have blurred the line between legislation
and adjudication. 20 6 In these circumstances, what can it mean to
complain that a prospective-only ruling is inconsistent with the judicial role? The difficulty is illustrated in one of Justice Scalia's
separate opinions in the Supreme Court's series of cases effecting the
transition from limited retroactivity to a "firm rule of
retroactivity":207
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense "make" law. But they
&

201. See HENRY M. HART
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 604 (William N. Eskridge & Philip
P. Frickey, eds. 1994); Milan M. Durgala, Note, Prospectively Overrulingthe Common
Law, 14 SYR.L. REV. 53, 54-56 (1962-63).
202. Sunburst, 287 U.S. at 366.
203. See Rogers, supra note 36, at 54.
204. See Volpe v. Trim, 708 F.3d 688, 702 (6th Cir. 2013)
205. See Currier, supra note 21, at 221-22.
206. See Richard S. Kay, JudicialPolicy-Makingand the PeculiarFunctionof Law,
26 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 237, 243-49 (2007).
207. Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278 n.32 (1994).
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make it as judges make it, which is to say as though they
were "finding" it-discerning what the law is, rather than
decreeing what it is today changed to, or what it will to20
morrow be.
In his separate opinion in the case, Justice White pounced on this
obscure description of the proper role of courts:
[Eiven though the Justice is not naive enough (nor does he
think the Framers were naive enough) to be unaware that
judges in a real sense "make" law, he suggests that judges
(in an unreal sense, I suppose) should never concede that
they do and must claim that they do no more than discover
it, hence suggesting that there are citizens who are naive
20 9
enough to believe them.
There is no more contested issue in American law than the propriety
of independent policy-making by courts. 2 10 Prospective judgments
dramatically spotlight that controversy. It is not surprising that this
has been a difficult and contentious issue for courts and commentators alike. It will be impossible to arrive at a coherent and generally
accepted approach to the retroactive or prospective application of new
judicial declarations of law until there is an equally well accepted definition of the proper allocation of lawmaking authority.

208. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)
209. Id. at 546 (White, J., concurring).
210. See generally Kay, supra note 206.
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